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1 Introduction
Within just 1 year, the combined impact of the Stern Review (Stern 2007), the
Fourth Assessment Report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC 2007a, b, c), Al Gore’s Oscar-awarded documentary climate film (Gore 2006),
and the activities of innumerable nongovernment organizations (NGOs), business
councils and citizen groups, have brought about a dramatic increase in the public
and political awareness of the climate change problem. Today, the reality and
widespread implications of anthropogenic climate change are no longer seriously
disputed. Climate change has moved to the top of the political agenda. The question
is no longer “Are we experiencing a human-made change in climate?” but “What
must we do about it?”
The credit for this sea change must go to a large part to the patient efforts
of scientists over many decades, transmitted and amplified by IPCC and gifted
communicators. It is therefore most appropriate that the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize
has been awarded jointly to the IPCC, chaired by Rajendra Pachauri, and Al Gore.
However, having contributed to the political acceptance of the urgency of the
climate problem, climate experts (in the broad sense, including climatologists,
economists, social-scientists, legal experts, etc.) now need to accept a major new
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responsibility. Policymakers face a task of unprecedented complexity and difficulty:
the transformation of our present unsustainable global socio-economic system into
a sustainable system that will maintain the planet Earth sufficiently close to its
present state to ensure the welfare and security of future generations. Moreover,
this transformation must be brought well underway with one or two decades.
There exist already many divergent proposals for an international climate agree-
ment to succeed the first assessment period of the Kyoto protocol in 2012. These
are being discussed in many national and international conferences, such as the
Conference of the Parties of the UN First Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) in Bali, December 2007. However, in order to converge towards
a common post-Kyoto climate agreement, policymakers will need advice based
on objective, rational analyses provided by independent climate experts. And if
effective, efficient and equitable policies are to be agreed upon within the limited
time window available, the interactions between policymakers and climate experts
will need to be much more intimate and on a continuous basis than in the past.
Two problems must be resolved before an effective interaction between climate
experts and policymakers can be established: (1) the means of communication and
(2) the generation of the relevant information. Let us discuss first the problem
of communication.
Climate experts have been highly effective in communicating the scientific basis
of climate change to the general public and policymakers through the reports of
the first IPCC Working Group (IPCC 2001a, 2007a). However, the influence of
IPCC on portfolios of policies and measures (as opposed to government targets
and rhetoric) through the second and third IPCC Working Groups on impacts,
mitigation potentials and costs (IPCC 2001b, c, 2007b, c) has been much smaller.
This is mainly because of the chosen IPCC stance of not engaging in policy debate.
IPCC is rightly seen as a politically detached panel, providing “policy-relevant, not
policy-prescriptive” information. Its task is to collect and summarize the diverse
investigations carried out independently by the scientific community, not to advise
on specific questions posed by policymakers.
The effect of the political detachment of IPCC is very evident in the Stern Review.
In contrast to the IPCC Reports, the Review is arguably the most comprehensive
and powerful document to date on the portfolios of policies required to address the
climate change problem. The summary of the scientific evidence of climate change
in the first part of the report draws heavily on IPCC Working Group 1 (including a
preview of the Fourth Assessment Report, presented later in February, 2007) and
is uncontroversial. However, the subsequent sections on impacts and policy had
little guidance from the diverse summaries of Working Groups 2 and 3 in the IPCC
Third Assessment Report, which were rather dated, or from the texts of the Fourth
Assessment Report, which had not been completed. In order to arrive at strong
policy recommendations, Stern was therefore forced to freelance by commissioning
research and reviews. This has naturally opened the report to criticism. The scientific
community should respond constructively to such criticisms by providing stronger
scientific foundations for the assessment of climate policy proposals, drawing on the
now published full IPCC Reports.1
1The IPCC Synthesis Report was agreed and the Working Group 2 and 3 Reports were published by
November 2007.
Climatic Change (2008) 89:219–229 221
2 An independent climate policy panel
Although the latest report of Working Group 3 in the Fourth IPCC Assessment
Report (IPCC 2007c) focuses more strongly on climate policies, what is needed
is a more continuous, ongoing interaction between climate experts and climate
policymakers. This could best be established by the creation of an independent
UN “Climate Policy Panel” (CPP). Presently, governments are advised by special
interest groups or by national bodies, such as the UK Government’s Climate Change
Committee2 or the German Government’s Scientific Advisory Committee on the
Global Environment. The CCP would need to have a similar remit as such national
bodies, but would be an international expert panel assessing policies from a supra-
national global perspective. It could report directly to the Parties of the UNFCCC,
either as a re-constituted or an additional Subsidiary Body. In contrast to the IPCC
working groups that report on the current status of climate change issues only every 5
to 6 years, the analyses of the CPP would be documented on a quasi-continuous basis
in direct support of the ongoing negotiations of the UNFCCC parties. In addition,
the task of CPP would be to analyze other policy proposals, brought into the debate
by climate-concerned business networks or NGOs. This would enrich the discussion
through further inputs screened by an independent agenda-free scientific panel.
As a panel of experts, the function of CPP would differ from that of the two
existing UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies for Scientific and Technological Advice and
for Implementation. These bodies focus on the exchange of information and experi-
ence between active policymakers and stakeholders, rather than on the interaction
between decision-makers and independent experts engaged in analyzing the impact
of proposed climate policies.
The impartiality of the Climate Policy Panel would need to be ensured by agree-
ment of all UNFCCC parties. The panel itself would naturally not be able to resolve
the inherent conflicts of interest of climate policy. But by producing quantitative
analyses accepted by all parties, it could act as an impartial broker promoting
an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding. This could be an important
contribution to overcoming the different perceptions and interests that have often
blocked progress in international climate policy. The International Energy Agency
(IEA) partly fulfills this role, but there are concerns that it may be perceived as
representing the interests of the energy consumers, rather than those of the energy
producers, and of society as a whole. Nevertheless, the secretariats of both the IEA
and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries maintain global dynamic
models that are routinely used to address global climate and energy policies, and
which could provide useful input to the analyses of the Climate Policy Panel.
3 International integrated assessment modelling
This brings us to the second question: are these and other available models the
right tools to provide the information required by policymakers? We argue below
that, through their detachment from the political process, the typical integrated
2See http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/uk/legislation/committee/index.htm.
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assessment (IA) models developed so far by the scientific community lack many
of the ingredients essential for realistic assessments of climate policy. Most models
are based on obsolete concepts of economic equilibrium, full global employment
and exogenous technological change. In addition, and more serious when there
are competing explanations of system change, many of the detailed models are
based on only 1 year’s data, which is patently inadequate3 for understanding the
transformation of the global energy system required to achieve the more stringent
targets being proposed by governments—quite apart from the wider implications
for the world economy of substantial mitigation action. Before creating a formal
UNFCCC Climate Policy Panel, it may therefore be advisable to form first an
informal network of integrated assessment modellers that would be willing to jointly
develop criteria and methods of evaluation for a common suite of complex, dynamic
models designed specifically for climate policy analysis.
Climate policy cannot be considered in isolation. It is inextricably intertwined
with broader global concerns, such as north-south inequality, immigration pressure,
interregional conflict, terrorism and national security. A meaningful suite of IA
models would need to address these more general issues, in addition to traditional
economic problems, such as gross domestic product (GDP) growth, technological
development, investments in renewable energy, know-how transfer, international
trade and competitiveness—as well as other important economic factors such as
unemployment, consumer preferences or life-style issues, which are normally ignored
in IA models. They should also include a diverse set of instruments for fiscal and
monetary policy and incorporate features for testing robustness under uncertainty.
Finally, they would need to be sufficiently flexible to enable simulations for a wide
range of policy portfolios.
The limited quality and availability of data preclude the construction of a fully
specified world model including all of these considerations. Ideally, a comprehensive
model should provide assessments of policy impacts at a detailed country level, and
offer short-term (quarterly), annual, or 5-yearly projections into the distant future.
However, one can create a suite of model sub-systems, each sub-system focusing
on a particular aspect of the complete model suite. An individual model sub-system
would need to be designed as a model tree, rooted in a simple conceptual model
based on a small set of dominant processes, and branching into more complex model
versions incorporating further processes. Tree structures clarify whether the ordering
of dominant and secondary processes implicit in every model concept is internally
consistent. In the process, they define the level beyond which further complexity is
no longer justified by the data and the uncertainty of the model parameters. Thus,
paradoxically, the development of a full suite of model sub-systems—although still
a major challenge—would be considerably simplified by the limited predictability of
the climate and socio-economic systems, since this restricts the attainable complexity
of the model trees.
To interpret the output of the model simulations, the model suite would need to
be augmented by a multi-criteria post-analysis package (Ackerman and Heinzerling
2004) rather than a traditional cost-benefit analysis. This avoids the requirement to
translate human life expectancy and ecosystem survival into monetary values, and
3See (Barker 1998; DeCanio 2003; Beinhocker 2006).
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allows for an explicit assessment of risk.4 The model suite and post-analysis package
would need to be designed as an internally consistent homogeneous system (the
difficulties of interpreting the results of an inhomogeneous model ensemble are
well documented by model intercomparison studies, cf. Weyant 2000; Löschel 2002;
Edenhofer et al. 2006).
In addition to these general considerations, a model suite designed for policy
analysis would need to incorporate three key elements. The first is a multi-actor
design. This applies both for the simulation of the negotiations between nations and
the evolution of the global socio-economic system itself. Different countries make
different contributions to climate change, are affected differently by climate change,
and have different economic development levels, energy systems and opportunities
for low-cost abatement. They also have divergent views on equity. The analysis
of climate policy therefore needs to be carried out from the perspectives of many
different national or regional negotiators. Similarly, the economic evolution of indi-
vidual regions within the global socio-economic system is governed by the conflicting
goals and actions of many different economic actors, such as business, governments,
consumers, media, interest groups, and NGOs.
The second key element is the dynamic nature of the socio-economic system.
This is a natural corollary of the multi-actor structure: interactions between actors
typically represent dynamic processes. Models starting from the traditional paradigm
of economic equilibrium, in which the multi-actor structure is absorbed in a static
“invisible hand” with full information and perfect foresight, are inadequate for most
climate-policy applications, in which the dominant concerns are non-equilibrium
global adjustment processes, such as the transfer of technology, the asymmetrical
diffusion of knowledge and information, unemployed resources, and pressures of
population migration, especially from rural to urban areas.
The third key element, finally, is the inherent uncertainty and unpredictability of
the coupled climate-socio-economic system. This property must be reflected both in
the uncertainties of the basic model parameters and in the stochastic evolution of the
system trajectories resulting from amplifying feedbacks and unpredictable noise in
key system components.
4 Examples of proposed integrated assessment modelling
The interplay between these features is best illustrated by some simple examples.
Traditional economic assessments of climate policies have been based on cost-
benefit analyses (Nordhaus 1994). A climate policy is regarded as beneficial if the
discounted sum S = M + D of the mitigation costs M and the residual climate
damages D is less than the business-as-usual climate damages D0. Thus climate
policies below the indifference line M + D = D0 in the cost-benefit plane (Fig. 1a)
are regarded as acceptable, policies above the line as unacceptable. There are many
problems with the cost-benefit approach (van den Bergh 2004), most notably the
treatment of climate catastrophe (Weitzman 2008). But apart from these general
limitations, a global cost-benefit analysis has little meaning in the context of climate
4See the Springboard Editorial on the economics of a risk assessment.
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Fig. 1 The climate-policy cost-benefit plane: mitigation costs M versus climate damage costs D.
a The triangular region below the indifference line M + D = D0 (BAU climate damages) represents
the space of acceptable (beneficial) climate policies, the region above the line the space of unaccept-
able (detrimental) climate policies. b The climate-policy assessments of different countries will often
lie on different sides of the indifference line. c The challenge of a post-Kyoto climate agreement will
be to bring all arrows for all parties well into the acceptable triangle. d To be accepted as equitable
by all parties, all arrows must furthermore have the same endpoint
negotiations. Each country obtains a different result, dependent on the individual
conditions within the country (Fig. 1b).
Thus in the case of the Kyoto protocol, for example, the EU (as all other industrial
countries apart from the US and Australia) viewed the 5% reduction commitment
as yielding a net benefit, while the Bush administration concluded that it was
detrimental for the US; China supported the protocol since it profited from global
greenhouse gas emission reductions without itself being committed to mitigation
measures. The goal of the current post-Kyoto climate negotiations is to agree on a
longer-term policy that is significantly more ambitious than Kyoto and is regarded
as beneficial by all UNFCCC parties (Fig. 1c). However, it is not sufficient that
all individual cost-benefit arrows lie in the lower triangle of the cost-benefit plane.
The agreement must also be perceived as fair by everyone. This requires that all
arrows converge on the same point (Fig. 1d), after appropriate normalization of each
countries mitigation and damage costs. This implies, in turn, that a fair balance has
been achieved between the different actors’ perceptions of equity.
Climatic Change (2008) 89:219–229 225
A clarification of the different perceptions and assessments of a given climate
policy by the various UNFCCC parties requires a detailed analysis of the particular
situation in each country. Once a general agreement has been reached on the range
of global emission pathways to be considered, the modeling task is then to assess
the policy portfolios with respect to their effectiveness, efficiency and equitability
in realizing the pathways, as seen from the perspective of each country. This is
clearly no small task. However, it should be undertaken. A quantitative, objective
analysis of the detailed distribution of the global impacts and burdens, carried
out by an independent UN panel, would clearly carry significantly greater persua-
sive weight than the analyses of individual negotiators representing only a single
country’s interests.
5 Agreeing on a common climate policy
Agreeing on a common climate policy is a complex iterative process, in which
assessments based on model simulations are only one input. Some rather elementary
conclusions can be drawn already without application of sophisticated models.
Figure 2 shows the projected mean (BAU) curve (thick black) of the world-averaged
CO2 emissions per capita, as well as the level of reductions required within this
century if dangerous climate change is to be avoided (defined by the EU and other
bodies as a global warming no greater than 2˚C above the pre-industrial level). Also
shown are the estimated BAU per capita emission curves for a few representative
countries or regions, together with possible reduction curves that could result from
an international climate agreement. It is immediately clear from a first glance that,
whatever the details of the agreement, demands that the emerging economies (and
still more the developing countries) reduce their BAU emissions significantly in the
next decade or two are unfair. As long as the per capita emissions of the affluent
industrial economies greatly exceed those of the rest of the world, elementary
considerations of equity indicate that the rest of the world will not be willing to adopt
significant reduction measures.
Fig. 2 CO2 emissions per
capita for the world and four
representative regions. BAU
curves: black; reduction target
required to avoid dangerous
climate change: red. Possible
reduction curves to meet the
target: green
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This consideration must be qualified by the lead times required to introduce
renewable technologies. However, as long as large disparities persist between the
per capita emissions of the industrial countries and the rest of the world, the moral
responsibility for resolving this problem lies with the industrial countries. These
will need to transfer significant technology know-how and capital resources to the
emerging economies to enable them to reduce emissions within the extended, but
nonetheless finite time frame indicated in Fig. 2.
A quantification of these elementary considerations by an authoritative inter-
national panel would deflate some of the special-interest efforts to ignore the
implications of equity in international negotiations, just as the reports of IPCC
Working Group 1 led ultimately to the acceptance that climate change is real, and
not the “the world’s greatest hoax”.
A key element in analyses of emission reduction scenarios is the rate of techno-
logical change. There is general agreement that the technologies required to restrain
global warming below 2˚C are available already today. Their rate of implementation
is a question of cost, emission-reduction capacity and timing. Figure 3 is a sketch
of the wedge between the BAU emission curve and the low-carbon emission goal,
together with one possible realization of a sequence of renewable technologies that
could fill out the wedge (the hump in the ‘goal’ curve at the beginning of the 21st
century is an expression of the time lost in implementing effective climate policies
since the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992).
Technologies that are already market-competitive today, the so-called “no-regrets
options” such as increased energy efficiency in production and end-use (combined
heat-power generation, improved energy-efficiency of buildings, lighting and trans-
portation, etc.) would enter the market first. This would be followed by technologies
that require relatively small carbon prices to penetrate the market (e.g. sinks through
reforestation, biomass energy, wind power, hydro-electricity, geothermal energy).
Finally, solar technology, either solar thermal or photovoltaic, would need to be
introduced on a large scale.
Fig. 3 Time-resolved wedge
diagram for the transition from
the BAU CO2 emission curve
(top boundary) to the
low-carbon target (bottom
boundary). Higher prices for
solar energy present a price
barrier at current prices after a
few decades. The price barrier
can be overcome by efficiency
gains through learning by
doing and learning by
researching
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An alternative technology sequence could include extensive carbon capture and
sequestration (CCS), which, if proven, would be able to prolong the use of fossil
fuel, thereby delaying the need to introduce large scale solar energy technology.
Expanding the use of nuclear power is another option. However, the use of a
technology with unknown solutions to known risks, instead of renewable energy,
offering known solutions to known risks, will remain controversial.
Independent of these alternative technological development paths, a basic lim-
itation of the economically more viable methods of emission reduction is their
finite emission-reduction capacity. After a few decades, these technologies alone
will be unable to overcome the growth of the BAU emission curve, driven by the
rapid growth of the emerging economies. They will need to be supplemented by
technologies that sequester CO2, such as biomass energy with CCS, or that involve
direct air capture of CO2 and storage. In the longer term, the low-carbon goal can
be attained only through the large scale introduction of solar energy, an essentially
limitless energy source, if necessary combined with air capture and storage. At
current estimates of solar-energy costs, this implies, however, that towards the middle
of the century, the costs of emission reduction could rise from present values between
0% and 2% of global GDP to values ranging from 2% to 6% (Stern 2007).
The cost estimates today are nevertheless expected to drop significantly by
the time solar energy enters the market on a large scale through efficiency gains
resulting from investments in R & D (learning by researching) and from practical
experience (learning by doing). Adopting the optimistic cost reduction assumptions
of Edenhofer et al. (2006), obtained by extrapolating historical data for other major
energy-technology transitions (water/coal/oil/gas), the Stern Review estimates that
the global costs of switching from fossil to low-carbon energy technology are of the
order of only 1% of world GDP. A meta-analysis extrapolating to the 450 ppmv CO2-
eq stabilization level (the lower end of the Stern range) indicates that the costs vary
over a wide range depending on policies, and that over the next 50–100 years, with the
potential for improvements through international cooperation, the range includes
negative costs (i.e. benefits in addition to the benefits of reducing climate change;
Barker and Jenkins 2007). The possibilities of negative costs have been emphasized
in both the Stern Review and the IPCC WG3 Report.
To convince governments that the transition to a low-carbon economy can be
achieved without major dislocations, the present models of induced technological
change will need to be extended to genuine multi-actor models, including the impacts
of technological change on employment and other socio-economic factors of imme-
diate concern to policymakers. In this respect, it is encouraging that similar numbers
were obtained by Weber et al. (2005) using a multi-actor, dynamic Integrated
Assessment model, which simulated the interaction between climate change, endoge-
nous technological change, government-induced technological change, productivity
increase, level of employment, savings rates and other economic indices closer to the
concerns of policymakers.
The true costs of the long-term transition to a low-carbon economy depend on a
number of poorly predictable parameters and have been the subject of considerable
debate. It can therefore be helpful to view the larger picture and search for general
conclusions that are independent of controversial numbers. Figure 4 shows a sketch
of the BAU growth in world GDP, on a log scale, assuming an extremely modest
annual growth rate of 1%. As in all BAU projections, the costs of climate change are
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Fig. 4 Sketch of global BAU
GDP growth at the (very low
rate) of 1%/year (black curve)
and impact on growth of
mitigation costs of avoiding
dangerous climate change of
1% (green) and 5% (red) of
global GDP
ignored. Also shown in the graph are the impacts of a 1% and 5% loss in GDP due
to the costs of the transition to a low-carbon economy. The deviation from the BAU
curve for the case of a 1% GDP loss is scarcely discernible on the multi-decadal time
scales relevant for climate change. But even for the extremely pessimistic case of a
5% GDP loss by 2050 (the high-cost outlier relating to the 2oC target) quoted in the
IPCC Report (Barker and Jenkins 2007) combined with a very sluggish BAU GDP
growth rate of 1%, very few would dispute that the insurance premium for avoiding
major climate change is a worthwhile investment. This has been stressed also by Azar
and Schneider (2002) and Hasselmann et al. (2003).
Thus the central issue is not whether mitigation policies should be undertaken,
but which measures should be introduced, at which rate, and how the costs should be
distributed.
6 The ethical problem
This is not just a technical and economic problem, but equally a moral issue (see,
for example, Broome 1992, 2008; Schneider and Lane 2006). Climate change is a
much quoted case of Garret Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968): all
participants have a motivation to avoid implementing remedial actions themselves,
free-riding instead on the remedial actions of others. However, climate change is
the most extreme example conceivable: it affects everyone on the planet; its con-
sequences are unforeseeable, but could dwarf all other catastrophes of human civi-
lization; there exists only a finite time horizon for action; and there exists no higher
authority that can enforce compliance, even if a common policy is agreed upon.
Garret Hardin argued that relying on ethics without enforcement was doomed
to failure. His entertaining description of the emotional plight of the good moral
citizen duped by unrestrained free-riders undoubtedly appeals to many skeptics of
international climate policy. Unfortunately, in the case of climate change, we have
no other choice than to rely on human insight and moral responsibility. The creation
of an internationally accepted Climate Policy Panel within the UNFCCC, equipped
with the necessary modelling and analysis tools, could be an important factor in
generating the necessary insights.
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